I determined how moral frameworks shape parochial empathy and favor schadenfreude toward members of moral out-groups on social media. Specifically, this study investigates the process involving moral outrage over a perceived injustice that transitions into the pleasurable experience of schadenfreude upon learning of misfortune suffered by a perpetrator of that injustice. Data for this analysis were collected from 13 Reddit threads, their posts and comments (n=535) across 12 communities and subreddits. All threads and comments were in direct response to the same news occurrence. Reddit was chosen for its user anonymity and its decentralized, self-governance model's propensity to create echo chambers. It is hypothesized that moral outrage serves as the essential affective catalyst that confirms an individual’s out-group status and activates parochial empathy and schadenfreude. This research integrates the theoretical frameworks of parochial empathy, moral outrage, and schadenfreude/Affective Disposition Theory (ADT) to guide it, linking the intergroup empathy bias (parochial empathy) directly to the enjoyment (schadenfreude) an individual experiences from a perceived just punishment experienced by a moral out-group member. A qualitative textual analysis of collected data was conducted to examine instances of collective anger towards a member of a moral outgroup after suffering a great misfortune, accompanied or followed by schadenfreude. Data coding focused on rhetorical strategies to encode instances of moral judgment, parochial empathy, and schadenfreude. Following the results, I discuss the impact of moral out-group framing on parochial empathy and how schadenfreude is enabled by parochial empathy after witnessing or learning of a moral out-group member's suffering.

Does an abuser have dignity? There are some concepts of human dignity that believe it to be inalienable, meaning it can’t be lost. An example of this is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Although it does not explicitly state that dignity is inalienable, it does state “ inherent dignity and of equal and inalienable rights” (Preamble). Many have taken this to imply that not only are rights inalienable, but so is dignity. The abuser and the victim would both have dignity. In this presentation I argue that human dignity can be lost and, therefore, should not be understood as inalienable. In support of my argument, I will make a case for dignity as moral status determined by respect for your own and another's autonomy. Due to this, disrespect of this autonomy would result in the loss of dignity. I will draw from Kant’s categorical imperative as it pertains to autonomy, and Catholic thought, mostly the concept of mortal sin. These concepts provide a helpful understanding of what it means to lose your dignity and how it may be restored. Establishing this concept of human dignity will be important as it explains how someone would lose their dignity. This presentation aims to not only present an argument for why human dignity can be lost, but also provide an understanding of what human dignity is. It encourages us to think more carefully about the role dignity plays in moral discourse.

This research examines mentorship within Aristotelian virtue ethics and investigates whether society provides accessible sources of the moral guidance that Aristotle requires for character formation. Aristotle believes moral excellence is developed through habituation—a type of training that produces virtuous behavior—rather than through mere acquisition of knowledge or adherence to laws. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes that the virtues are like skills developed through a process of scaffolded training. Virtue begins at an early age, as dispositions, qualities, and skills cultivated in youth shape intellect and character. Central to this process is the presence of virtuous mentors who model good character, and provide guidance and scaffolding for developing “phronesis”. Although Aristotle stresses the necessity of moral exemplars, he provides little practical guidance regarding who those individuals are or how they can be identified. This omission creates a challenge to implement Aristotle’s theoretical framework. Specifically, it asks who qualifies as a moral mentor, how to identify a moral mentor, and whether virtue ethics functions as a practical ethical system when such mentors are difficult to identify. Through analysis of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics this study explores the practicality of mentorship. Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with individuals over the age of fifty, based on the hypothesis that extensive life experiences contribute to the development of virtuous character and provide insight into the qualities of effective role models. By addressing the problem of locating real-world moral exemplars, this research seeks to bridge the gap between Aristotelian theory and ethical practice.